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AFTERWORD
THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE*
A unifying theme of this Symposium is as old and enduring as the
common law: when and how can a well-established, successful adjudica-
tive institution be adapted to meet the demands of new and substantially
different situations? There have been splendid triumphs of transference,
such as Lord Mansfield's appropriation of the law merchant in the eight-
eenth century as a major building block of modem commercial law.'
There have also been embarrassing failures, like the abortive effort to
transport American labor law concepts en masse into the alien British
environment of the early 1970s.2 The common question confronting the
participants in this Symposium is whether our private, voluntarily devel-
oped system of labor arbitration, or a system patterned on it, can operate
effectively in a workplace that is increasingly subject to governmental
regulation, including resurgent state regulation under more relaxed pre-
emption law; in the public sector where the employer is the sovereign
itself; and in industrial settings that in recent years have been more and
more likely to lack a union presence.
Charles Craver's comprehensive article, Labor Arbitration as a Con-
tinuation of the Collective Bargaining Process,3 provides not only a valua-
ble overview of the legal treatment of labor arbitration since the
Steelworkers Trilogy but also what Craver considers the necessary impli-
cations of Justice Douglas's acceptance of the notion that labor arbitra-
tion is "part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself."'4
Perhaps most important, the concept supports the Supreme Court's tight
limitations on judicial review of arbitration decisions because, as Craver
puts it, courts in enforcing awards "merely direct the contracting parties
to honor the results of their own private, dispute-resolution machinery." 5
* James E. and Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B., Fordham
College, 1951; J.D., University of Michigan, 1954. Since late 1987 the author has served as Reporter
for the Uniform Law Commissioners' Drafting Committee on the Uniform Employment Termina-
tion Act, chaired by Stanley M. Fisher, Esq., of Cleveland, Ohio. The views expressed in this paper
are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Conference of
Commissioners, the Drafting Committee, or its chair.
1. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 350, 657-70 (5th ed. 1956).
2. 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW 190 (2d ed. 1977).
3. 66 CHi.-KENr L. REV. 571 (1990).
4. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
5. See supra note 3, at 591.
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Today, as Craver discusses, the hottest issue concerning arbitral fi-
nality probably involves awards that may conflict with sound public pol-
icy-awards putting back to work alcoholic airline pilots, gun-toting
postal workers, psychologically unstable or rule-flouting workers in nu-
clear power plants, and the like. In all or nearly all these instances, how-
ever, the employer would have violated no statute or regulation if it had
taken on its own the action the arbitrator ordered. As between the par-
ties, therefore, the arbitral award should be as binding as any other just
cause determination lacking arguably public overtones. Once again, an
employer in contesting an award is simply trying to escape its own con-
tractual commitments, this time on a policy ground no legislature or
agency has seen fit to adopt. The Supreme Court in its Misco decision,
6
analyzed by Craver, seems generally in accord with this characterization
of what is occurring.
For all its apparent appeal as a rationale for sustaining arbitration
awards, and despite the high authority behind it,7 the continuation-of-
the-bargaining-process theory is not necessary, in my opinion, as a basis
for arbitral finality, and in some instances it may be positively mischie-
vous. As I have argued elsewhere at greater length," the simpler and
more conventional explanation of the courts' deference to arbitration
awards is not something peculiar to collective bargaining. The parties
have jointly commissioned the arbitrator to give their agreement a defini-
tive reading-"final and binding" is the customary phraseology-and a
court is doing no more than enforcing their contract to that effect, as it
would any other contract. In decisions long predating the Steelworkers
Trilogy, the courts held that they would not review the merits of arbitral
awards in commercial settings and would look only at procedural fair-
ness, fraud, partiality, or total irrationality.9 The contractual nature of
the arbitration process was stressed in most opinions.
The potential mischief that I see flowing from an excessive emphasis
on arbitration as a continuation of collective bargaining harks back to an
6. Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987). The Court did not go so far, however, as
to say that an arbitral award should be enforced so long as it does not order illegal conduct.
7. In addition to the Supreme Court in Warrior & Gulf, supra note 4, see Feller, The Coming
End ofArbitration's Golden Age, in NAT. ACAD. ARa., PRoc. 29TH ANN. MEETING, ARBITRATION-
1976, at 97, 107 (B. Dennis & G. Somers eds., 1976). In light of the common law's historic hostility
toward arbitration, I find more force in the bargaining process theory as a special basis for upholding
executory agreements to arbitrate rather than the subsequent awards.
8. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise
Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140-42 (1977).
9. See, e.g., Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1855); Park Constr. Co. v. Independent
School Dist., 216 Minn. 27, 11 N.W. 2d 649 (1943); see also Harrell v. Dove Mfg. Co., 234 Or. 321,
381 P.2d 710 (1963). Cases are collected in 5 AM. JUR. 2d Arbitration & Award § 167 (1962); 6
C.J.S. 2d Arbitration § 2, at 162-64 (1975).
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ancient debate between an influential pioneering arbitrator, George Tay-
lor, and J. Noble Braden, then tribunals vice president of the American
Arbitration Association.10 Taylor believed strongly that arbitrators
should be activist intervenors in the parties' disputes: mediating, educat-
ing, and otherwise helping the parties flesh out their "skeleton" agree-
ments. Yale Law School Dean Harry Shulman, the famous Ford
umpire, was of a like mind. Braden and others, such as Columbia Pro-
fessor William Leiserson, vigorously disagreed, advocating a judicial
model as more in keeping with the trend toward increasingly detailed
contracts and the parties' own provisions strictly limiting arbitrators' au-
thority. The Taylor-Shulman approach undoubtedly had its greatest ap-
peal in the formative years of collective bargaining, when inexperienced
negotiators lacked the skills to anticipate problems and address them ef-
fectively. Ultimately, however, the Braden view pretty much prevailed,
perhaps primarily because that is what the parties wanted. Indeed, even
today I find nothing so rankles advocates for both unions and manage-
ment as an arbitrator who is overly intrusive at a hearing.
Of course I accept Craver's position that arbitrators should not be
mere passive spectators, especially when they are unclear about the
meaning of some piece of evidence that has been submitted to them. But
I think he treads on dangerous ground when he becomes so enthralled
with their role as "participants in the continuing collective bargaining
process"'1 that he encourages actual intervention, even to the extent of
mediation. A few rare souls may have the diplomatic skills to pull this
off without arousing resentment and proving counterproductive. Even
then, as Craver recognizes, there is the risk that a failed mediation will
leave the arbitrator burdened with confidential disclosures he is supposed
to disregard when he resumes his arbitral role. (I must not think of ele-
phants!) I further agree that if the disputants seem to be overlooking an
obvious solution to their problem, a quiet huddle with counsel in the
corridor may serve a useful purpose. Nor would I deny that in particular
cases a union and an employer may come to have such a high regard for
their permanent umpire that they actively invite her to switch to a medi-
ating mode. But ordinarily, the relatively sophisticated parties in the
contemporary world of labor relations can be assumed to have set out to
engage a judge for their dispute when they have reached the last step in
their grievance procedure, and that is generally what they should get.
10. For a good summary of the controversy, see Nolan & Abrams, American Labor Arbitration:
The Maturing Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 557, 611-13 (1983).
11. See supra note 3, at 627-28.
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To my mind Craver is on target when he endorses the NLRB's Col-
lyer 12 policy of deferring to arbitration in section 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bar-
gain cases but rejects the Board's United Technologies13 policy of
deferring as well in section 8(a)(3), 8(b)(2), and similar individual rights
cases. The essential distinction, theoretically, is between contractual and
statutory rights, and, pragmatically, between group and individual inter-
ests. It is the Board's function to adjudicate NLRA statutory claims,
initially, and an arbitrator's (or, more precisely, a court's) function to
adjudicate contractual claims. As I see it, an employee should not lose
his statutory access to an antidiscrimination remedy just because his
union has secured an additional contractual claim-at least not if the
union hasn't expressly waived his right of resort to the Board, and any
such waiver, naturally, ought to raise other issues. Craver makes all the
right arguments about this and I needn't repeat them.
On the other hand, the refusal-to-bargain case involving an asserted
contractual defense ordinarily turns on group claims dependent on a par-
ticular contract interpretation. Contract interpretation and enforcement,
even though sometimes necessary, is not the primary business of the
Board. 14 It thus seems appropriate to "defer" to arbitration in many
section 8(a)(5) cases. I have one cautionary word. An arbitrator's ruling
of no contractual violation, even if correct, does not necessarily mean no
statutory violation. The arbitrator may have concluded the employer's
action did not breach the contract, not because the contract authorized
the action, but because the contract simply did not cover the matter.
That would still leave open the question of possible unilateral action con-
cerning a mandatory subject, in violation of the statutory duty to
bargain. 15
If a thesis can possess both power and subtlety, then Michael
Harper has managed the feat. In his article, Limiting Section 301 Pre-
emption: Three Cheers for the Trilogy, Only One for Lingle and Lueck,
16
Harper starts out with the forthright concession that collective bargain-
ing and labor arbitration in the post-Golden Age' 7 no longer have the
12. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
13. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
14. In enacting § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988), Congress chose not to
make breaches of collective agreements as such unfair labor practices subject to the remedial power
of the NLRB. Instead, the enforcement of the labor contract was left to "the usual processes of the
law." H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947). But cf NLRB v. C&C Plywood Corp.,
385 U.S. 421 (1967).
15. See NLRB v. C&C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
16. 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 685 (1990).
17. See Feller, supra note 5. For Professor Feller, the Golden Age was a period of maximum
union-management autonomy in workplace governance.
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field of workplace regulation all to themselves (they never really did), but
must accommodate a whole host of old and new federal and state laws on
the subject.
Harper's major contribution is to rewrite the Supreme Court's opin-
ions in the Lueck 18 and Lingle 19 cases. He convincingly argues that the
Court went astray in making section 301 preemption of a state law claim
turn on the question of whether there has to be an interpretation-at
least any significant interpretation-of a collective bargaining agreement.
Harper observes that the great virtue of the Trilogy was to create salutary
yet revocable presumptions for the parties rather than to saddle them
with conclusive rules of law, and that such channeling without compul-
sion should serve as a model for most applications of section 301. He
then goes on to advocate a new preemption principle: there should be no
preemption of a state law action that exists independently of a collective
agreement and can proceed without reference to rights secured or duties
imposed by that agreement. Moreover, the preemption of state law
rights that depend on the terms of an agreement ought to be only a rebut-
table presumption, based on the likelihood that most employers and un-
ions do not intend to create state-defined rights and obligations by
negotiating a labor contract.
The power of this analysis lies in its imaginative synthesis of several
different strands of Supreme Court policy and doctrine-the Lincoln
Mills 20-Lucas Flour2' emphasis on uniform section 301 law as a means of
promoting free collective bargaining; the flexibility fostered by the Tril-
ogy through the use of presumptions reversible by the parties; and the
Metropolitan Life 22-Lingle recognition of the value of sustaining, even for
unionized employees, certain state minimum benefit or employee protec-
tion laws. Specifically, the advantage of a more relaxed preemption stan-
dard is to clear the way for applying to organized work forces such
salutary state laws as those guaranteeing a right to privacy and protect-
ing employees against wrongful discharge.
Subtlety comes into play with Harper's handling of particular appli-
cations of his proposed new preemption rules. Thus, for example, he
would not deny an employee the benefit of a state law right merely be-
cause a collective agreement might have waived the right, and there
would have to be a resort to contract interpretation to make that deter-
18. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
19. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
20. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
21. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
22. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
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mination. Going back to basics, Harper stresses that even if uniform
federal law must be used to decide whether a collective agreement has
waived or compromised a minimum state guarantee (the author raises
some good questions about even that seemingly unchallengeable proposi-
tion), there is no necessity for arbitration under the contract in such a
case in order to preserve industrial peace. A state court should therefore
be able to deal with the issue directly.
Similarly, Harper displays much subtlety in distinguishing between
the kinds of state minimum benefit laws that should and should not be
preempted. Drawing upon the earlier Oliver 23-Machinists24 preemption
rulings, the author develops a more general theory that the ultimate test
should be the extent of the burden imposed on free collective bargaining.
A state law that conditions certain nonnegotiable benefits on an em-
ployer's granting of other specified benefits will discourage the negotia-
tion of the latter more than an unconditional benefit law that operates
without regard to the parties' own bargaining. That distinguishes Lueck
(preemption) from Lingle (nonpreemption) but leaves unexplained Met-
ropolitan Life, where Massachusetts was upheld in conditioning its re-
quirement of mental health care upon an employer's providing of general
health insurance. Harper takes his best (but not entirely convincing)
shot at rationalizing Metropolitan Life by pointing out that the state law
there granted an "additional independent [?] substantive benefit,"' 25 while
the state law at issue in Lueck "provided additional remedial protection
... for a benefit created by the collective agreement."' 26 There is more
pragmatic force to Harper's suggestion that a state may be entitled to
infer from an employer's provision of one substantive benefit that it is
economically capable of providing another substantive benefit, but that a
state should not be entitled to intrude on the remedial scheme collec-
tively devised by a union and an employer for the enforcement of their
agreement.
Harper's overall stance is by no means antipreemption. Thus, he
would approve the result in Steelworkers v. Rawson,27 where the Supreme
Court rejected a claim by miners' survivors under Idaho's general tort
law that a union's negligent inspection of a mine had contributed to the
miners' accidental deaths. The Court reasoned that the union's right to
inspect arose out of a collective agreement and hence the scope of its
23. Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
24. Machinists Lodge 76 v. WERB, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
25. See supra note 16, at 730.
26. Id.
27. 495 U.S. 362 (1990).
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duty depended on the terms of that agreement. Harper disputes this rea-
soning but concludes that preemption was appropriate under his theory
because otherwise unions would be discouraged from negotiating an in-
creasingly important employee benefit-a safe workplace.
Harper may not have all the answers to the many conundrums still
being posed by the constantly evolving, persistently perplexing subject of
federal preemption. But his elegant essay has persuaded this reader that
the Supreme Court's reliance on the need to interpret a collective agree-
ment as the touchstone in Lueck-Lingle situations is much too simplistic.
The Court in Garmon,28 Machinists,29 and Sears, Roebuck 30 had to disa-
vow earlier attempts to establish "bright line" tests in this area. Harper's
innovative formulation of a comprehensive preemption standard is more
a matter of degree. That sometimes makes distinguishing among cases
such as Lueck, Metropolitan Life, and Rawson less predictable. In my
opinion, however, an approach like Harper's, which focuses on such fun-
damental values as the integrity and efficacy of the collective bargaining
process, will prove in the long run both more realistic and more
enduring.
Ann C. Hodges effectively dismantles several conventional myths in
The Steelworkers Trilogy in the Public Sector.31 She starts off, quite ap-
propriately, by underscoring the practical importance of collective bar-
gaining and arbitration in government employment. Even as private
sector unionization declined precipitously over the past three decades,
the organization of public employees soared spectacularly, reaching al-
most fifty percent of the twelve million full-time work force by the late
1970s.32 Hodges then goes on to show that "while courts frequently pay
lip service to the Trilogy principles [in public sector arbitration cases], in
reality they often fail to apply them."' 33 Finally, in the most significant
portion of her article, she tackles what I have described as the "myths."
First, it has been argued that the limited experience with arbitration
in public employment militates against any presumption of arbitiability
on the basis of demonstrated efficacy or acceptability. As Hodges points
28. San Diego Bldg. Trades v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (shifting emphasis from adequacy
of federal remedy to "arguably" protected or prohibited nature of conduct itself).
29. Supra note 20 (conduct neither protected nor prohibited may still be preempted if central to
the federal regulatory scheme).
30. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (conduct "argua-
bly" protected or prohibited may nonetheless be subject to state regulation under certain
circumstances).
31. 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 631 (1990).
32. H. EDWARDS, R. T. CLARK, JR. & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 7-8 (2d ed. 1979).
33. See supra note 31, at 634.
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out, however, arbitration at its best offers the same advantages in the
public as in the private sector, namely, a fast, cheap, and informal
method of dispute resolution. She also notes that many state statutes
specifically authorize or mandate grievance arbitration. She might have
added that nearly all these statutes, as well as the more generalized state
collective bargaining laws, postdated the 1960 Trilogy, and, absent some
express reservation, could fairly be assumed to have embraced its
teachings.
Next, a number of scholars, public officials, and state courts assert
that different rules should apply because of the employer's status as the
sovereign, its special responsibility to meet the manifold and often essen-
tial needs of the citizenry, and its public accountability for decisionmak-
ing based on the political process and not the competitive market. Some
of the most articulate proponents of this view of the public employer, at
least at the initial contract negotiation stage, were a group of Yale Law
School professors. 34 I have sometimes speculated that they may have
been overly influenced by their geographical proximity to New York City
during a period of its most shortsighted and financially disastrous labor
relations. In any event, I agree with Hodges that to the extent that pub-
lic policy is implicated in the enforcement of an arbitration agreement or
award, substantially the same criteria should ordinarily apply in both the
private and public sectors. Hodges is on target when she observes that a
typical situation arousing a court's ire will involve an arbitrator's rein-
statement of an alcoholic file clerk in some agency. Yet the reinstate-
ment of an alcoholic bus driver (or airline pilot) employed by a private
company creates a far greater potential danger for the public. If unique
constraints are to be imposed in public employment, that should be a
function of the citizens' elected or appointed representatives acting upon
the problem as a general matter, not the function of a court dealing with
a solitary arbitral award.
Lastly, it may be contended that the extensive statutory regulation
of public employment justifies closer judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards
to prevent conflict between them and overlapping legislation. Superfi-
cially, there is merit in this position, but Hodges is right in rejecting it in
the end. As long as the parties have properly authorized the arbitrator to
construe or apply a statute, expressly or impliedly, any error of law
should be treated essentially the same in the public sector as in the pri-
34. See, e.g., Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking,
44 U. CIN. L. REV. 669-73 (1975); Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83




vate. The key is that the arbitrator is fulfilling a contractual commission
by the parties to render a certain statutory interpretation, which they
have agreed to accept as final and binding. A court in enforcing the arbi-
tral award is not placing its imprimatur on the arbitrator's interpretation;
it is simply holding the parties to their agreement. The only exception is
if the public employer has exceeded its authority in agreeing to arbitrate.
And, naturally, if the agency could not have entered into a contract with
the union embodying the terms of the award because they were illegal or
ordered illegal acts, a court should not enforce the award, just as it would
not enforce a contract to the same effect. A final qualification is that
third parties, such as individual employees, may have statutory rights
personal to them, which cannot be waived by their employer or union,
either directly or through arbitration.35
The remaining papers in this Symposium, as well as Clyde Sum-
mers' Kenneth M. Piper Lecture for 1990, deal with collective bargaining
and arbitration in employment settings that lack a traditional majority
union serving as exclusive bargaining representative. Summers' lecture
makes an ideal bridge because he analyzes the situation lying somewhere
between majority union and no union-the case of the minority union.
Since his piece technically falls outside the Symposium, I shall largely
confine myself to a doffing of the cap to this old master. His thesis in
Unions without Majority--A Black Hole 36 is the kind we have come to
expect from him-original, provocative, constructive, and timely.
Summers maintains that in the absence of a majority union exercis-
ing the power of exclusive representation, a minority union should be
entitled to represent its members in disciplinary hearings and to strike or
picket to back up its demands upon an employer. He even argues what
many might consider the unthinkable, at least until exposed to his per-
suasiveness: section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA obligates employers to bargain
collectively with minority unions. More practically, Summers suggests
particular roles for minority unions. They may provide the shield of
''concerted activity" to remove the vulnerability of individual protesters
under Meyers Industries.37 They may help workers to understand and
pursue their numerous employment rights under federal and state stat-
utes and the developing common law. And of course they may serve as
halfway houses on the way to full-fledged majority status.
These views are not quixotic. For example, although Summers does
35. Cf. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (arbitral award cannot
bar employee claims under Fair Labor Standards Act).
36. 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531 (1990).
37. 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 123 L.R.R.M. 1137 (1986).
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not mention it, several public sector unions, such as the American Feder-
ation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, have successfully used
as an organizing device the representation of nonunion government
workers in civil service proceedings.
David Lewin, in Grievance Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces: An
Empirical Analysis of Usage, Dynamics, and Outcomes,38 comes up with
some figures that are not surprising, and others that are. Perhaps not so
startling, a recent survey shows that almost half the nonunion businesses
covered have written grievance procedures for some employees. On the
more surprising side, about one-fifth of these procedures include third-
party arbitration. I am left a little uncomfortable by Lewin's reliance on
a study of a single nonunion company for several of his findings, but at
least they are intriguing. For example, he challenges the famous "exit-
voice" theory of Albert Hirschman39 and Richard Freeman4° by pointing
out that nonunion grievance procedures are more likely to be used by
employees who intend to leave their employer.
Contrary to the soothing assurances I have heard from business rep-
resentatives, Lewin concludes, on the basis of data from five firms, that
grievance filers have significantly higher turnover rates and significantly
lower performance ratings and promotion rates than nonfilers in the
post-grievance period, even though there were no significant differences
between filers and nonfilers preceding the grievance. Lewin concedes this
might conceivably be attributed to more careful personnel assessments
following the grievance. But I gather the likelier explanation is employer
reprisals, subtle or not so subtle, against the grievance filers.
The propriety of participating in nonunion arbitrations has become
a bone of contention within the National Academy of Arbitrators. 41 In
addition to the concerns reflected in Lewin's paper, there is worry that
such procedures are simply union-avoidance devices and that the deck is
heavily stacked against the grievant, who is a one-time player against the
repeater employer. On the other hand, it can be argued that granting the
employee some substantive and procedural rights is better than nothing,
and that there is a growing group of plaintiffs' lawyers who can help
redress the imbalance between the parties. My personal experience,
though limited, lends support to both positions. Along with a former
38. 66 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 823 (1990).
39. A. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
40. R. Freeman, The Exit-Voice Tradeoff in Labor Markets: Unionism, Job Tenure, Quits, and
Separations, 94 Q. J. EcON. 643 (1980).
41. See, e.g., Walt, Employer Promulgated Arbitration Systems Raise Questions, The Chronicle
(NAA Journal), Oct. 1989, at 2, col. 1.
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president of the National Academy, I was appointed to a rotating panel
of arbitrators for a nonunion enterprise. Each of us had a couple of cases
in which the grievants were obviously guilty and we duly sustained the
discharges. Then came closer calls-momentary misconduct against the
background of long and praiseworthy records-and we put the termi-
nated employees back to work. Neither of us has yet been asked to serve
again. Would prior knowledge of those consequences have affected
our-or any other arbitrators'-decisions? I surely hope not. But at any
rate the process has benefited several workers who otherwise would have
been out on the street.
Samuel Estreicher and Matthew W. Finkin provide less empirical
but wider-ranging studies of arbitration in nonunion contexts. In Es-
treicher's article, Arbitration of Employment Disputes without Unions,42
and Finkin's Commentary43 on it, the two scholars prove worthy of each
other's steel as they cross swords on the appropriate scope of arbitration
in resolving individual employment disputes. Estreicher comes out as
the doughty champion of voluntarism and the capacity of employees,
both sophisticated executives and unsophisticated rank-and-filers, to
agree to channel not only contractual but also statutory claims to arbitra-
tion, subject to the preservation of an adequate prearbitral role for the
relevant administrative agency and "meaningful" judicial review of the
arbitrator's award in cases involving statutory rights.
Finkin will have none of this accommodation between the private
arbitration system and protective labor law. He stands four-square for
the proposition that "statutory rights . . . are best entrusted to public
tribunals.""4 Along the way, Finkin would read the Federal Arbitration
Act, which strongly and preemptively supports arbitration agreements,
in a wholly literal fashion and exclude all contracts of employment4 5
from its coverage. Here, too, Estreicher would seek instead an accom-
modation between the FAA and applicable labor legislation. This rude
summary of mine does an injustice, needless to say, to the refined and
perceptive arguments of both authors.
Regardless of the outcome of the debate over the FAA's applicabil-
ity to individual employment contracts (Finkin should easily prevail if
"textualism" has indeed become the fashion of the day), I believe Es-
treicher makes a good case that private arbitration has an important part
to play, even in disputes over statutory claims, unless the legislation itself
42. 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753 (1990).
43. 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 799 (1990).
44. Id. at 809.
45. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
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provides otherwise.46 Safeguards must of course be installed to ensure
that statutory rights are not impaired. That will probably mean more
searching judicial review than we are used to when only contract claims
are at stake.47 There will also need to be close scrutiny of possible coer-
cion, surprise, or other overreaching by a more powerful employer. With
those qualifications, however, what we should have is a freely bargained
agreement between consenting adults, not prohibited by law, to invoke a
process that may furnish both parties with a quicker, cheaper, and sim-
pler solution to their controversy than the law itself. I have to admit
there may be some inconsistency between my position here and my ear-
lier objection to the NLRB's deferral of individual discrimination
charges to contractual arbitration under a collective bargaining agree-
ment. But I am still enough of an individualist to think there is a differ-
ence between an employee who agrees on her own to take her statutory
claims to arbitration in the first instance rather than to court and an
employee who suddenly finds her access to the Board for the vindication
of statutory rights cut off by an agreement between her union and her
employer. That is especially true if the union intended the arbitration
route merely as an extra option, not as a mandatory alternative.
In discussing the growing number of grievance-arbitration systems
unilaterally established by nonunion employers, Estreicher and Finkin
also clash over the implications of the long-neglected section 8(a)(2) of
the NLRA, which prohibits company unions. Some firms, to make their
procedures more accessible and attractive, even provide grievants with
free representation by members of the company's personnel department
or place fellow employees on the adjudicatory body. For Estreicher, the
key to the nonapplicability of section 8(a)(2) in these situations is the
absence of any "collective representation of employee interests"
48
designed to "undermine the conditions for forming a truly autonomous
institution" 49 as bargaining agent. To Finkin, however, the schemes Es-
treicher would approve are just latter-day versions of the ancient em-
ployee-management "joint councils" and similar "cynical efforts to
46. The Supreme Court recently held that an individual employee who had agreed to arbitrate
all employment disputes could be required to submit a claim under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act to arbitration. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 59 U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S.
May 13, 1991).
47. Technically, as I see it, an individual arbitration agreement covering statutory claims brings
the matter before the arbitrator as a contract issue between the parties. Estreicher elaborates on this
point, supra note 42, at 775. But when sensitive rights under antidiscrimination and other protective
labor laws are intimately involved, regardless of their theoretical nature in a given proceeding, I
doubt that the courts will remain aloof and let an arbitrator mangle an employee's claim.




counter unionization," 50 which the legislative history makes clear were
exactly the sort of devices Congress intended to banish by adopting the
original section 8(2) of the Wagner Act.51
Finkin has a lot going for him in the 1934-35 legislative history.5 2
He can even contend, with considerable justification, that the Congress of
that day deliberately chose what we now would call the adversarial
model of labor relations in preference to the contrasting cooperative
model. Yet perhaps it is not a real betrayal of legislative intent to read
the words on the yellowing pages of the statute book with an awareness
of the vastly changed circumstances since the blue-collar, downtrodden
working world of the 1930s.3 Context shapes meaning. Some of us out-
siders may deem the employees of today's high-tech firms short-sighted
in overlooking the benefits of unionization, but if they knowingly and
freely accept a different format for dealing with their employers in the
post-industrial era, I do not feel the language of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2)
is so clear and unyielding as to constitute an insuperable barrier to their
desires.
Finkin does not address the last part of Estreicher's article, in which
he suggests that an administrative agency rather than arbitration would
be the best means of enforcing any new legislation in this country requir-
ing good cause for the dismissal of employees. Estreicher's views are of
special interest to me, because I was the principal draftsperson for a com-
mittee of the Uniform Law Commissioners that prepared the new Model
Employment Termination Act.M As Estreicher indicates, the drafting
committee opted for arbitration as the preferred method of enforcement,
50. See supra note 43, at 814.
51. 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
52. See generally Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section
8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499 (1986); Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Argu-
ment Against Judicial Revision of Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1662 (1983). For other views, see Moberly, New Directions in Worker Participation and Collec-
tive Bargaining, 87 VA. L. REV. 765 (1985); Note, Participatory Management Under Sections 2(5)
and 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1736 (1985); Note, New Stan-
dards for Domination and Support Under Section 8(a)(2), 82 YALE L.J. 510 (1973).
53. Many persons will probably respond that there are still lots of workers in the 1990s-in the
fast-food outlets, the fruit, vegetable, and sugar cane fields, and numerous other menial service occu-
pations-who desperately need the attention of protective, if not paternalistic, labor legislation. We
are not talking, of course, about waivers of substantive rights, but only about agreements to channel
claims in a particular way. Even there, the courts would have to be vigilant against abuses through
misrepresentations, contracts of adhesion, and other means.
54. For the text of the model act as finally approved by the Commissioners on August 8, 1991,
see 9A LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) IERM 540:21 (1991). Detailed recommendations concerning the
provisions to be included in such a statute may be found in Summers, Individual Protection Against
Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates:
Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56 (1988).
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although enforcement through an administrative agency was adopted as
an alternate procedure.
Estreicher recognizes two aspects to the claim of expertise as a pri-
mary reason for favoring arbitration in wrongful discharge cases. The
first is the body of arbitral precedent that has accumulated during half a
century of grievance arbitration under collective bargaining since World
War II. The second aspect is the availability of a substantial group of
expert decisionmakers who may be engaged as independent contractors
as required, without the need to establish a large, permanent agency staff
at the outset.
Estreicher regards the first portion of this argument as "particularly
problematic,"' 55 since arbitration in unionized settings typically involves
rank-and-fie workers. A more comprehensive wrongful termination
statute will generate many claims by supervisory and managerial person-
nel and other higher-level employees exercising considerable discretion.
There is force to this objection, but I think it gravely underestimates the
capacity of a sound decisionmaking system to produce a set of general
principles that may profitably be adapted to apply in quite different con-
texts. Canada now uses private arbitrators as adjudicators under its
wrongful discharge legislation, which covers the federally regulated sec-
tor of employment. 56 That country's most noted management attorney
has assured me that he finds no serious problem as an advocate in arbi-
trating under the Canadian statute's just cause standard, regardless of the
level or status of the employees involved.
57
Although Estreicher finds more merit in the second part of the rea-
son for using arbitration, namely, the ready availability of expert deci-
sionmakers, he winds up by questioning whether the need to handle large
numbers of cases wouldn't justify the use of an administrative agency
with a regular cadre of civil servants who could quickly develop the req-
uisite experience. Ultimately, the choice between private arbitrators and
a new or established agency is highly pragmatic. For me, however, a
state would maintain maximum flexibility by relying on outside ad hoc
arbitrators while moving into this uncharted area, with a pending
caseload that simply cannot be predicted at this time.58 Furthermore,
against the background of a dwindling demand for their services from the
55. See supra note 42, at 794.
56. CANADA LABOUR CODE § 240 et seq., Stats. Canada, 1977-78, 26-27 Eliz. II, c. 27 at 9-12.
57. Conversation with Roy L. Heenan, Esq., of Montreal, Quebec, August 1988.
58. As Estreicher observes, one careful scholar has estimated that of approximately two million
nonprobationary, nonunion employees discharged annually, about 150,000 would have a cause of
action under a just cause standard. See supra note 42, at 793 (citing Stieber, Recent Developments in
Employment-at-Will, 36 LAB. L. J. 557, 558 (1985)). Lack of central reporting prevents accurate
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unionized sector, the skills of private arbitrators are constantly being en-
hanced, and their numbers augmented, through training and develop-
ment programs conducted by the American Arbitration Association, the
National Academy of Arbitrators, and various professional and educa-
tional organizations.
Estreicher proceeds by listing several disadvantages he finds in arbi-
tration as compared with administrative agencies. I think his first, con-
stitutional concern can be easily cured in most states by having the
arbitrator, whether selected by the parties or appointed by a state agency,
formally invested with the powers of office by a government official. 59
Next, Estreicher worries about the cost effectiveness of using private ar-
bitrators whose per-diem fees may range upwards of $400. Now, of
course, the state may set the fees any way it wants, as the model act
recognizes. But apart from that, free enterprise can be counted on to
spur high productivity. In my experience, few salaried government deci-
sionmakers come close to matching the output of 100 or more cases a
year handled by the full-time professional arbitrator.
There is a screening problem that Estreicher correctly identifies.
Ordinarily, arbitrators do not weed out nonmeritorious cases in advance
of a hearing. But I think that Estreicher exaggerates the efficiency that
would be lost by entrusting that preliminary function to the agency ad-
ministering the arbitration process. Earlier drafts of the model act would
have so provided. Both the management and plaintiff representatives ad-
vising the drafting committee recommended deleting the screening step
on the grounds that it would be a mere formality. I am not wholly satis-
fied with the result. At the time the committee made the decision, it was
still likely that complainant employees would be required to pay half or a
substantial part of the arbitration costs; that would obviously have served
as a built-in screening device. Later the committee reached the quite
principled conclusion that the state should bear nearly all the costs of the
adjudicatory process. That raises the screening issue anew, but I con-
sider this an entirely separate question from the desirability of
arbitration.
I accept the main thrust of Estreicher's last two points, namely, the
need for due process and fuller judicial review in publicly mandated pro-
ceedings. But at most these would reduce some of the relative advan-
tages of private, contractual arbitration; they are not disadvantages of
figures on the current rate of suits on common law theories, but I have heard knowledgeable active
practitioners say there may be around 10,000 a year.
59. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 408 Mich. 410, 294 N.W. 2d 68
(1980), app. dismissed, 450 U.S. 903 (1981).
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arbitration vis-A-vis administrative processes. In any event, due process
in a very genuine sense has become an accepted component of well-con-
ducted contractual arbitration. 60 And, recognizing the validity of con-
cerns like Estreicher's second, the final version of the model act lists a
"prejudicial error of law" among the grounds for vacating an arbitrator's
award.
One of the most specific proposals I have seen for using an adminis-
trative agency to enforce a wrongful termination statute would place re-
sponsibility in the hands of the state's unemployment compensation
commission.6' Procedurally, that is wholly appropriate. Substantively,
and perhaps psychologically, I think it is ill-advised. From the perspec-
tives of both employer and employee, it would be a mistake to muddle
the criteria for discharge and for compensation. Employees whom an
employer should be entitled to terminate may be deserving of unemploy-
ment compensation. There could even be cases when the converse would
be true. Theoretically, of course, a hearing officer could be directed to
apply quite different standards in rendering the different judgments. But
I believe the distinction can be much better maintained by keeping the
functions separate.
The genius of the common law is its flexibility and adaptability-its
capacity to generalize from particulars, and then derive a new particular
from the generalization. Underlying this entire Symposium is an analo-
gous theme-the capacity of private, contractual arbitration to adapt to a
widely varying new world of employer-employee relations. The institu-
tion may go all the way from the private, contractual arbitration of statu-
tory issues to public, contractual arbitration and eventually reach
publicly mandated statutory arbitration in the private sector. I hope I
am not being too professionally chauvinistic in thinking this now-almost-
venerable process is fully up to the challenge.
60. See, e.g., Aaron, The-Role of the Arbitrator in Ensuring a Fair Hearing, in NAT. ACAD.
ARB., PROC. 35TH ANN. MEETING, ARBITRATION 1982-THE CONDUCT OF THE HEARING 30-49
(J. Stem & B. Dennis eds., 1983); Fleming, Due Process and Fair Procedure, in ARBITRATION IN
PRACTICE 68-78 (A. Zack ed., 1984).
61. Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee, 16 U. MICH. J. L. REF.
207 (1983).
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